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Corporations
By WILLBURT D. HAM*
INTRODUCTION
The number of cases involving corporation law considered
by the Court of Appeals during the past year was characteris-
tically small, and the cases which were considered presented
issues of essentially routine character. This is not surprising
since the flow of corporate litigation in Kentucky, as with many
other states of comparable size, cannot be expected to reach
the volume found in the larger commercial states or the more
popular incorporating states. However, since Kentucky is now
a Model Act state' as the result of the adoption of its Business
Corporation Act in 1972,2 recent cases from other Model Act
jurisdictions take on added importance. Several of these cases
have been selected for special comment in addition to the Ken-
tucky cases decided during the past year.3
I. CORPORATE ENTITY
One of the more significant Kentucky cases decided during
1974 involved the now famous Glen Turner promotional
schemes, which have become the subject of extensive litigation
elsewhere as well.4
In Dare To Be Great, Inc. v. Commonwealth,5 the state
instituted a suit against Dare To Be Great, Inc., Glen W.
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1937, University of Illinois; J.D.
1940, University of Illinois; LL.M. 1941, Harvard University.
I ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
AcT].
2 Ky. AcTs ch. 274 (1972).
3 The Model Act, drafted by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association, "has been
adopted substantially or in large part in more than 35 states, and has served as an
influence on the corporation laws of many others." Sebring, Proposed Changes in the
Model Business Corporation Act, 28 Bus. LAwYER 329 (1973).
'See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973); Frye v. Taylor, 263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). See generally
Note, Pyramid Schemes: Dare to be Regulated, 61 Gao. L.J. 1257 (1973).
5 511 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1974).
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Turner Enterprises, Inc., and Glen W. Turner, individually,
seeking to enjoin the defendants from engaging in certain trade
practices claimed to be unlawful under Kentucky law,6 and to
recover damages resulting from these practices. One of the con-
tentions raised by defendants was that the court had no juris-
diction over Glen W. Turner, individually, or Glen W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc., because the activities charged as wrongful
were carred on in Kentucky by Dare To Be Great, Inc., a sepa-
rate legal entity. However, the evidence showed that Dare To
Be Great, Inc. was a wholly owned subsidiary of Glen W.
Turner Enterprises, Inc., a Florida corporation licensed to do
business in Kentucky, and that the manner in which Dare To
Be Great, Inc. carried on its activities was such as to give the
impression that the entire operation was under the guidance
and direction of Glen W. Turner and the parent corporation
Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.'
The Court of Appeals had little difficulty reaching the
conclusion that all defendants were proper parties to the suit,
in view of the interplay among the defendants in the carrying
out of the challenged promotional activities.8 In taking this
position, the Court followed a rule of long standing that the
separate legal entity of a corporation must not be allowed to
act as a shield for fraud.' Accordingly, said the Court, the sepa-
rate existence of Dare To Be Great, Inc. should not be allowed
to shield the parent corporation, Glen W. Turner Enterprises,
I The trade practices claimed to be misleading and deceptive consisted of a pro-
motional scheme involving the sale of a series of motivational tapes to a purchaser for
the sum of $1,000, who was then encouraged to induce others to buy the program, on
the basis of receiving a commission of $400 on each such sale after the first two and a
commission on the first two sales made by all those he brought into the program.
Because of the "chain-letter" effect of the plan, it was charged that the vast majority
of those brought into the program had no chance of earning any profits. Id. at 225-26.
The plan of operation involved what were called Go-Tours, whereby prospective
purchasers of the motivational program were offered an all-expense paid trip to con-
veniently located resorts where the Dare To Be Great Program was described and films
were shown in which Glen W. Turner explained how he had achieved success and how
they too could be successful by following his methods. Id. at 226.
8 Id. at 226-27.
9 The Court cited as authority the leading case of United States v. Milwaukee
Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905), in which Judge Sanborn
had said that "when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an
association of persons." (Emphasis added).
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Inc., and its principal shareholder, Glen W. Turner, from re-
sponsibility for the trade practices carried on under their direc-
tion.'
The conduct of the defendants in this case made it a rather
clear one for "piercing the corporate veil."'" In other contexts,
however, the propriety of ignoring the corporate form is less
clear, calling for analysis of such matters as the extent to which
the formalities of separate corporate existence have been ob-
served, the manner in which control over the corporate busi-
ness has been exercised, and the extent to which the business
has been adequately capitalized. Some courts stress adherence
to the requirements of corporate form,' - while others show a
greater willingness to take account of such factors as inade-
quate capitalization. 3 Whatever the emphasis, however, courts
have made it clear that they will not let interposition of the
corporate entity prevent a result they deem otherwise re-
quired.'4
II. FmuCIAR DuTIEs
A second case worthy of note decided by the Court of Ap-
peals during 1974 involved a suit charging breach of fiduciary
duty on the part of an officer-director of a corporation in termi-
nating his association with the corporation and setting up a
competing business. In Aero Drapery of Kentucky, Inc. v.
Engdahl,5 the defendant Engdahl, in addition to being an
owner of ten percent of the stock in Aero Drapery, was a direc-
tor and treasurer of Aero, which was engaged in the retail sale
of custom-made draperies. Engdahl was employed by Cox
' The Court held that the promotional scheme involved fraudulent and mislead-
ing conduct within the meaning of Ky. REv. STAT. § 367.170 (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as KRS], and upheld the action of the trial court in granting a permanent
injunction prohibiting the continuance of such practices and in awarding damages.
" For another Kentucky case in which the Court had little difficulty "piercing the
corporate veil" on grounds of public policy, see Veterans Serv. Club v. Sweeney, 252
S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1952) (illegal gambling operations).
12 See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966) (tort
liability); Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 127 N.E.2d 832, 140 N.Y.S.2d 512
(1955) (contract liability).
13 See Minton v. Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961) (tort liability);
Automotriz del Golfo de Cal. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1957) (contract liability).
" In re Clarke's Will, 284 N.W. 876, 878 (Minn. 1939).
" 507 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1974).
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Manufacturing Company, in which he was also a stockholder,
as an administrative assistant to J. H. Cox, the founder and
controlling stockholder of both Aero and Cox Manufacturing
Company, which was a wholesale supplier of drapery material.
Engdahl acted as a liaison man for Cox with the Aero organiza-
tion, reporting to him on the status of the business and em-
ployee morale. During 1967, Engdahl, along with several other
employees of Aero, decided to organize a competing business.
They did so before terminating their employment with Aero,
copying forms and charts used in Aero's business. Engdahl also
discussed his participation in a confidential stock bonus plan
and exposed confidential financial information concerning the
operations of Aero.
The Court of Appeals held that these actions constituted
a clear violation of Engdahl's duty of loyalty to Aero.16 Al-
though the Court referred to the former statutory provision in
Kentucky which stated that "officers and directors shall be
deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation," 7
the Court pointed out that such fiduciary relation exists inde-
pendently of statute, 8 and that Engdahl's conduct fell below
the standard expected of corporate fiduciaries. 9
In line with this reasoning are decisions elsewhere which
have condemned similar actions by directors or officers in set-
ting up a competing business to the detriment of their corpora-
tion,20 in enticing key personnel of the corporation to leave and
" Id. at 170.
, KRS § 271.365 (repealed). The present Kentucky Business Corporation Act
does not contain any statutory statements as to the fiduciary status of directors or
officers nor does it contain a statement as to the standard of care expected of directors
and officers. This is in line with the present make-up of the Model Act, which likewise
does not contain any such provisions. However, the Committee on Corporate Laws, at
its meeting on September 21, 1974, approved a revision of the provisions of the Model
Act pertaining to the board of directors which would add an affirmative statement of
the standard of care expected of directors. See Sebring, Report of Committee on Corpo-
rate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAWYER 501 (1975).
" 507 S.W.2d at 168.
Id.
2 Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 34 N.E.2d 704 (Mass. 1941). In this case the court
said that a director or officer of a corporation is not precluded from entering into an
independent business in competition with the corporation so long as he acts in good
faith. Id. at 707. The importance of this element of good faith was emphasized by the
court in Tovrea Land & Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 412 P.2d 47 (Ariz. 1966), where
[Vol. 63
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join them in a competing business, 2 or in revealing confidential
information of corporate affairs. Thus, the position of the
Court with regard to Engdahl would appear to be a justified
application of the law of fiduciary duty as applied to corporate
officers and directors.
It might seem surprisin that such seemingly obvious cases
involving breach of fiduciary duty by corporate officials con-
tinue to arise. The answer may lie in the fact that there still
seem to remain persons holding controlling interests in corpo-
rations who are not fully sensitive to the fiduciary restrictions
which such positions impose upon them.? The decision in Aero
should serve to emphasize once again the high standard of
loyalty expected of corporate personnel while serving in their
official capacities.
the court said: "[Tihe essential inquiry of the 'business competition' doctrine is good
faith. Good faith will insulate the directors or officers from liability unless the rival
business is actually and demonstrably detrimental to the corporation." Id. at 57.
Where the business is only similar but not in direct competition, it has been recognized
that an officer of a corporation may engage in such business without violating his
fiduciary obligation to his corporation. Lancaster Loose Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Robinson,
250 S.W. 997 (Ky. 1923).
11 Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 117 N.E.2d 237, 121 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1954). There has
been some recognition of the privilege on the part of an officer or employee of a
corporation to organize a competing business and take with him other key employees
where their employment is at will and no other elements of improper conduct are
involved, such as unlawful use of trade secrets and the like. Spring Steels, Inc. v.
Molloy, 162 A.2d 370 (Pa. 1960). However, where the enticement to leave is coupled
with other elements of improper conduct, even such courts seem willing to concede that
this could constitute a violation of fiduciary duty. Id. at 372. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op AGENCY § 393, comment e (1957).
n Components for Research, Inc. v. Isolation Prods. Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1966) (trade secrets). Although the forms and charts copied in Aero were not
found to be trade secrets, the Court nevertheless considered them to be corporate
property entitled to protection. 507 S.W.2d at 169. See generally RESTATEMENT (Sac-
oND) Op AGENCY § 395 (1957). The Kentucky Court inAero also concluded that Engdahl
had violated his duty to the corporation by failing to reveal his plans to organize a
competing corporation and to take key personnel with him, in view of the harm this
could foreseeably cause the corporation by decreasing the efficiency of its operations.
507 S.W.2d at 169. It has been said that it is not necessary that an officer disclose his
preparations to compete in every case but "only where particular circumstances render
nondisclosure harmful to the corporation." Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d
921, 936, 49 Cal. Rptr. 825, 840 (1966).
n See Hoggan & Hall & Higgins, Inc. v. Hall, 414 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah 1966), in which
the court observed: "We are cognizant of the fact that there are thousands of directors
who are unaware of the responsibilities of their positions, and do not realize that their




Turning to decisions from other jurisdictions involving
construction and application of Model Act provisions similar to
those in Kentucky, a recent case from the Supreme Court of
Oregon involving the effects of defective incorporation is of
particular interest. In Timberline Equipment Co., Inc. v.
Davenport," the plaintiff 'brought an action to recover certain
equipment rentals from three individuals, including a Dr. Ben-
nett, all of whom were named as defendants in the suit. The
trial court held for the plaintiff, but only Dr. Bennett appealed.
Dr. Bennett raised as a defense to personal liability that the
equipment had been rented to a corporation, Aero-Fabb
Corp., 5 of which he was the incorporator as well as a director
and shareholder. However, the equipment had been leased and
the rentals had been earned during a period between the time
the original articles of incorporation for Aero-Fabb had been
filed and a certificate of incorporation issued. The original arti-
cles of incorporation proved to be defective, and a certificate
of incorporation was not issued until some five months later
when new articles were filed. Dr. Bennett contended that dur-
ing this period Aero-Fabb should be considered a de facto cor-
poration or that plaintiff should be deemed estopped to chal-
lenge the existence of Aero-Fabb as a corporation. The Su-
preme Court of Oregon affirmed the judgment of the trial court
holding Dr. Bennett personally liable for the rental payments. 6
This case raises two questions of interest concerning the
treatment of defective incorporation under the Model Act: (1)
the extent to which the common law doctrines of de facto cor-
poration27 and "corporation by estoppel" remain viable con-
" 514 P.2d 1109 (Ore. 1973).
21 The actual name of the corporation according to its certificate of incorporation
was Aero-Fabb Co. Id. at 1113.
2 Id. at 1114.
2 The concept of de facto corporations was devised by courts for the purpose of
preventing collateral attack on corporate existence in private litigation where such
existence had little, if any, bearing on the merits of the controversy. Three requisites
were said to be necessary for the existence of a de facto corporation: (1) a statute under
which the corporation could be lawfully incorporated, (2) a colorable attempt (in good
faith) to comply with such statute, and (3) an actual user of corporate powers. See W.
FiarcHE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 3777 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1966). As might be ex-
pected, a considerable lack of consistency developed among courts in the application
[Vol. 63
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cepts providing insulation from personal liability, and (2) the
scope of personal liability imposed by the Model Act where
incorporation is defective. The relevant provisions of the Model
Act are contained in §§ 56 and 146. The first, § 56,29 provides
that the certificate of incorporation, when issued, shall consti-
tute conclusive evidence that the corporation has been incorpo-
rated. Section 14611 provides that all persons who assume to act
as a corporation without authority to do so shall be considered
liable for the debts and liabilities of the business. 31
The Oregon court concluded in Davenport that the de
facto doctrine had been abolished in Oregon as a result of the
adoption of the Model Act by the Oregon legislature in 1953.2
However, the court left open the effect of the statute on the
defense of "corporation by estoppel, ' ' 3 accepting the findings
of the trial court that the defendants had not met the condi-
tions necessary to permit application of the estoppel doctrine
even if it were still legally available.3'
of the doctrine, particularly with reference to what was sufficient to constitute "colora-
ble compliance." See Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De Facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA.
L. REv. 1153 (1952).
n The term "corporation by estoppel" is an elliptical expression used by courts
to describe cases in which they deny collateral attack on corporate existence for reasons
of fairness where the parties have dealt on a corporate basis but where the defects in
the incorporation procedure are so serious as to preclude application of the de facto
doctrine. See H. BALANTm, CORPORAONS § 31 (rev. ed. 1946).
" Section 56 reads:
Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the corporate existence
shall begin, and such certificate of incorporation shall be conclusive evidence
that all conditions precedent required to be performed by the incorporators
have been complied with and that the corporation has been incorporated
under this Act, except as against this State in a proceeding to cancel or
revoke the certificate of incorporation or for involuntary dissolution of the
corporation.
For the Kentucky counterpart of this provision, see KRS § 271A.280.
50 Section 146 reads:
All persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority so to do
shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or
arising as a result thereof.
For the Kentucky counterpart of this provision, see KRS § 271A.670.
'1 Professor George D. Hornstein has observed that the words in § 146 "without
authority so to do" presumably have reference to the existence of a certificate of
incorporation. G. HoRssTsm, COPOArON LAw AND 1hIcaE § 29 n.1 (1959). The
Oregon counterpart of the section so states. ORE. Rsv. STAT. § 57.793 (1973).
3 Oregon Laws ch. 549 (1953).
3 514 P.2d at 1111 n.1.
3There was evidence that the Aero-Fabb business had been operated as a part-
19751
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The present comments to § 56 of the Model Act, as con-
tained in the revised annotations to the Act published in 1971,
reveal a clear understanding on the part of the authors that §
56 was designed to eliminate the de facto doctrine. 5 The ex-
pression of this viewpoint is significant, because not only is
there nothing in the language of the section that necessarily
compels this position but also the earlier comments accompa-
nying § 56 (then § 50) were somewhat equivocal on the point,
referring to existence of a de facto corporation under the Act
as being a remote possibility." However, the new comments,
prepared since the 1969 revisions of the Model Act, are quite
firm and unequivocal in stating that the Model Act abolishes
the concept of de facto corporations. Furthermore, the new
comments to § 146 seem to indicate that it is the combination
of § § 56 and 146 that works to eliminate the de facto doctrine."
This, of course, leaves in question the status of the estop-
pel doctrine and whether it also has been eliminated by a com-
bination of § § 56 and 146. In what appears to remain the lead-
ing case on this question, Robertson v. Levy,"5 decided by the
nership before its incorporation in 1970 and that plaintiff had dealt with the business
on that basis rather than as a corporate entity. Id. at 1113.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. 2D § 56, 2 (1971).
The comments stated: "Since it is unlikely that any steps short of securing a
certificate of incorporation would be held to constitute apparent compliance, the possi-
bility that a de facto corporation could exist under such a provision is remote." MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 50, 4 (1960).
It is significant in this connection that, in 1965, the Supreme Court of Utah, in a
case presenting the question of when corporate existence began for purposes of apply-
ing the state's franchise tax, held that a provision such as that in § 56 of the Model
Act did not mean that a corporation de facto could not exist before the issuance of a
certificate of incorporation. Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 407 P.2d
683 (Utah 1965).
" These comments now state: "Under the unequivocal provisions of the Model
Act, any steps short of securing a certificate of incorporation would not constitute
apparent compliance. Therefore a de facto corporation cannot exist under the Model
Act." MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar ANN. 2D § 56, 2 (1971).
1 See, e.g., the following comment to § 146:
This section is designed to prohibit the application of any theory of de facto
incorporation. The only authority to act as a corporation under the Model
Act arises from completion of the procedures prescribed in sections 53 to 55
inclusive. The consequences of those procedures are specified in section 56
as being the creation of a corporation. No other means being authorized, the
effect of section 146 is to negate the possibility of a de facto corporation.
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 146, 2 (1971).
11 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Cir. 1964). In this case, Levy had agreed to form a corpora-
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the court took
the position that "the impact of these sections, when consid-
ered together, is to eliminate the concepts of estoppel and de
facto corporations."4 This is strictly a judicial inference, for
the comments to these sections in the annotations to the Model
Act are silent on the point. Perhaps, however, the reasons that
appear to have dictated the abolition of the de facto doctrine
should likewise apply to the estoppel doctrine. The comments
to the Model Act indicate that the basis for eliminating the de
facto doctrine was to remove from the law a confusing doctrine
no longer thought to be needed in view of the simplified proce-
dures for incorporating." Whether this argument is as applica-
tion to buy Robertson's business. Articles of incorporation were submitted to the Su-
perintendent of Corporations for filing but were rejected. Nevertheless, Levy began to
operate the business and Robertson executed a bill of sale of the business to the
"corporation," taking back an installment note signed by Levy as president of the
"corporation." A certificate of incorporation was later issued, but the business failed
and Robertson sued Levy for the balance due on the note. The court held Levy person-
ally liable to Robertson on the note.
40 Id. at 447. But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(estoppel invoked against third party in suit by corporation to recover amounts due
under contract with third party). The importance of the two sections together accom-
plishing the abolition of the estoppel concept is suggested by a Maryland case, where
the court applied the estoppel concept to protect the president of a corporation who
was unaware that articles of incorporation had not been filed from incurring personal
liability on a contract he had signed on behalf of the corporation. Although no mention
of Maryland statutory law was made by the court, it is significant that the Maryland
corporation statute contained a provision similar to that in § 56 of the Model Act
creating a conclusive presumption of corporate existence on the acceptance of the
articles of incorporation by the prescribed public official but did not contain the
companion provision in § 146 of the Model Act pertaining to personal liability on the
part of those assuming to act as a corporation without authority to do so. Cranson v.
IBM, 200 A.2d 33 (Md. 1964).
41 The comments to § 146, for example, contain the following observation:
Abolition of the concept of de facto corporation, which at best was fuzzy, is
a sound result. No reason exists for its continuance under general corporate
laws, where the process of acquiring de jure incorporation is both simple and
clear. The vestigial appendage should be removed.
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 146, 2 (1971).
Professor Ernest L. Folk, *II, one of the better known corporate draftsmen, seems
to think these reasons apply to the estoppel doctrine as well. He has suggested that,
given the ease with which corporations can now be formed, it would seem desirable to
make filing an absolute prerequisite for limited liability, thereby eliminating both
common law doctrines. Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1956-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875,
886.
Two additional jurisdictions with provisions similar to those contained in the
Model Act have expressed the view that such provisions are designed to eliminate the
1975]
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ble to the estoppel doctrine may be more doubtful, since the
estoppel doctrine provides a safety valve, or escape hatch, from
the imposition of what might seem to be an unduly harsh per-
sonal liability on persons unaware that there had been any
defects in the incorporation procedure.4 2
Under such circumstances it would be understandable if
a court felt reluctant to discard the estoppel doctrine without
a clearer expression of legislative intent to that effect. It is
significant that in the Robertson case the defendant Levy ap-
parently was aware that no corporation legally existed when he
executed a promissory note in the corporate name as payment
for the purchase of plaintiff's business. He was not, therefore,
a particularly strong candidate for protection under the estop-
pel doctrine, even though the plaintiff had dealt with him on
a corporate basis. Since it is the dealing on a corporate basis
which furnishes the support for invoking the estoppel, perhaps
the court felt that the only way to prevent Levy from obtaining
an unwarranted advantage from the estoppel doctrine was to
treat it as abrogated.
The remaining question considered by the Oregon court in
the Davenport case concerned the scope of personal liability
imposed by the Model Act where incorporation is defective.
The liability is quite extensive as to those to whom it applies,
involving liability for "all debts and liabilities" incurred as a
result of the defective incorporation.43 Liability applies to "all
persons who assume to act as a corporation,"" which raises the
question whether this description includes all investors in the
corporation, or only those who assume an active role in the
management of the business, or only those who participated in
the particular transaction giving rise to the obligation sued
concept of de facto corporatidns. See Swindel v. Kelly, 499 P.2d 291, 299 n.28 (Alas.
1972); Cahoon v. Ward, 204 S.E.2d 622, 624 (Ga. 1974). In the Cahoon case, however,
the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the doctrine of corporation by estoppel had
not been abolished in that state due to a special statutory provision preserving the
estoppel concept. Id. at 625. Similarly, in Minnesota, a special statutory provision
preserves both the de facto doctrine and the estoppel doctrine. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 301.08 (1969).
42 Consider, for example, the plight of Cranson in Cranson v. IBM, 200 A.2d 33
(Md. 1964), who, but for the willingness of the court to apply the estoppel doctrine,
would have faced a personal liability of over $4,000.




upon. 5 The Oregon court took the intermediate position that
the liability should apply to "those persons who have an invest-
ment in the organization and who actively participate in the
policy and operational decisions of the organization. '4 Since
Dr. Bennett was shown to have retained control over the con-
duct of the business, although the details of management had
been entrusted to another, the court approved the finding of
the trial court that Dr. Bennett was personally liable for the
rentals sued for by the plaintiff.
IV. PREINCORPORATION AGREEMENTS
Closely associated with the subject of personal liability
resulting from defective incorporation is the question of the
liability of promoters on preincorporation agreements. In fact,
the two types of liability can be easily confused. This confusion
surfaced recently in another significant case from the Supreme
Court of Oregon,4" in which the plaintiff attempted to use the
Oregon counterpart of § 146 of the Model Act48 to impose per-
sonal liability on defendants for a note executed by one of them
as part of a preincorporation transaction.
Defendants, who were real estate developers, planned to
develop certain land they held and sought financing through
the plaintiff, who suggested securing a commitment for a long-
term loan. It appeared that because of economic conditions any
such loan would have to carry an interest rate of at least 12
percent, which would be usurious if charged to an individual.
The plaintiff therefore informed the defendants that any loan
secured would have to be made to a corporation. The plaintiff
also required, as a prerequisite to seeking a loan commitment
41 There was lack of agreement at common law as to whether all participants, both
active and passive, in a defective corporation should be under personal liability or only
active participants. For constrasting viewpoints, compare Dodd, Partnership Liability
of Stockholders in Defective Corporations, 40 HARv. L. REv. 521 (1927) (stockholders
should be considered liable to third persons as partners), with Magruder, A Note on
Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corporations, 40 HARV. L. REv. 733
(1927) (passive stockholders should be protected). One well-known authority suggested
that unlimited liability should be fastened only on those participants who were aware
of their deliberate or negligent failure to incorporate. R. STEvENs, CORPORATONS 177-
79 (2d ed. 1949).
" 514 P.2d at 1114.
1 Sherwood & Roberts-Oregon, Inc. v. Alexander, 525 P.2d 135 (Ore. 1974).
4See note 30 supra.
1975]
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for the defendant, a "good faith deposit" amounting to one
percent of the proposed loan. Defendant Alexander informed
the plaintiff of the name of the proposed corporation, which the
plaintiff knew was not yet in existence, and signed a note pre-
pared by the plaintiff in the proposed corporate name on behalf
of such corporation. Plaintiff secured the needed commitment,
but it was rejected by the defendants, who had never at-
tempted to form the projected corporation. Plaintiff sued the
defendants on the good faith deposit note, contending that they
were personally liable for having assumed to act as a corpora-
tion without authority of a certificate of incorporation, contrary
to the provisions of the Oregon counterpart to § 146. The court
rejected this argument on the basis that the case was not one
involving defective incorporation but one concerned with
preincorporation promoters' contracts, to which the statutory
provision relied on by the plaintiff would not apply. The court
considered the statute to be directed to the common law de
facto and estoppel doctrines rather than the common law rules
governing preincorporation agreements.49
Treating the liability of the defendants as dependent on
the law pertaining to preincorporation agreements, the court
applied the general rule that a promoter is normally personally
liable on contracts he makes on behalf of a contemplated cor-
poration, unless the other party agrees to look to the corpora-
tion, and not to the promoter, for payment." The court af-
firmed the trial court judgment for the defendants, based on
evidence that the plaintiff was looking only to the projected
corporation for payment of the note.51
V. OTHER KENTUCKY CASES
In closing out this review of corporation cases, mention will
4 525 P.2d at 138. The line of demarcation between the two situations may on
some occasions be a thin one, particularly where a promoter acts on behalf of a contem-
plated corporation but the third party has no knowledge that the corporation is not
yet in existence. The court may assume that the law pertaining to defective incorpora-
tion applies in such a case. See Heintze Corp. v. Northwest Tech-Manuals, Inc., 502
P.2d 486, 487 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972).
Quaker Hill, Inc. v. Parr, 364 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1961). See generally 1 W.
FLErCHER, PRvATE CORPORAMNS § 215 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1974).
1, 525 P.2d at 140. The cause was remanded to the trial court for an award of
attorney fees to defendants pursuant to a provision in the note.
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be made of several additional cases dealing with corporate law
issues decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals during 1974.
In one of these cases,52 it was held that a provision in the bylaws
of a rural electric cooperative corporation to the effect that "no
person shall vote as proxy for more than three (3) members at
any meeting of the members" did not preclude a person named
in a proxy from designating substitutes to vote for various
members so as to avoid violating the bylaw provision." Another
case54 afforded an opportunity for the Court to once again rec-
ognize that it is the law of agency which determines the author-
ity of officers or agents to bind the corporation in transactions
with others, and that under agency law a corporation may be
held to have ratified the acts of officers and agents not pre-
viously authorized by the board of directors where the corpora-
tion has enjoyed the benefits of the transaction.55
In a case" involving the question of what constitutes the
acquisition of the controlling capital stock of an insurance com-
pany under the insurance statutes of the state (which require
the approval of the Commissioner of Insurance for any such
change of control),57 the Court held that it was proper for the
Commissioner of Insurance to issue an order prohibiting the
solicitation of proxies pending his determination whether an
11 Toler v. Clark Rural Elec. Cooperative Corp., 512 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1974).
3 Another interesting feature of this case was the refusal of the Court to sanction
an award of an attorney's fee to successful parties in a suit to set aside an election of
directors. The Court adhered to the position that the corporation must have received
a pecuniary benefit to justify an award of an attorney's fee. Id. at 26-27. This require-
ment of pecuniary benefit has suffered attrition over the years and was rejected out-
right by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light &
Power Ass'n, 101 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 1960). The Supreme Court of the United States
has expressed approval of this relaxed attitude in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375 (1970), involving an award of attorneys' fees to successful litigants in a suit
charging violation of the proxy rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
"American Convalescent Centers of Ky., Inc. v. Daniel, 514 S.W.2d 192 (Ky.
1974).
Id. at 194.
McGuffey v. Western Pioneer Life Ins. Co., 510 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1974).
KRS § 304.24-410 provides:
(1) Any person proposing to acquire the controlling capital stock of any
domestic stock insurer and thereby to change the control of the insurer, other
than through merger or consolidation or affiliation as provided for in this
subtitle, shall first apply to the commissioner in writing for approval of such
proposed change of control . . ..
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acquisition of 14.8 percent of the stock of an insurance com-
pany constituted the acquisition of a controlling interest in
that company. The Court concluded that a regulation of the
Commissioner of Insurance establishing a presumption that
any acquisition of 15 percent or more of stock constituted an
acquisition of the controlling stock should not be interpreted to
mean that an acquisition of less than 15 percent could never
constitute an acquisition of the controlling stock." The Court
defined an acquisition of controlling stock as simply "any ac-
quisition that probably will furnish the basis for the acquirer,
with his particular intents and capabilities, to take control." 9
Finally, the Court of Appeals decided two cases concerning
application of the Kentucky "long-arm" statute to corpora-
tions.0 In one,"1 the Court found the venue provisions of that
statute, which permit the suit to be brought in the county in
which the plaintiff resides, to be available to a plaintiff in his
suit against a foreign corporation doing business in the state.
The defendant corporation had argued that, since it had desig-
nated a process agent as required by the foreign corporation
provisions of the Kentucky corporation statute,62 venue was
controlled not by the "long-arm" statute but by the usual
venue provisions for civil actions brought against corpora-
tions.63 In the second case,64 the Court held that the "long-arm"
statute could be applied to a nonresident corporation, if other-
wise found subject to the statute, even though the acts which
formed the basis for the suit occurred before the effective date
of the statute.
The regulation provides:
Section 1. The acquisition by or for the benefit of any person of 15 per
cent- or more of the outstanding voting capital stock of a domestic insurer
shall be presumed to be for the purpose, but not necessarily to the exclusion
of other purposes, of changing the control of such insurer, and shall subject
such person to the requirement of first making written application to the
Commissioner for approval thereof.
4 Ky. AD. REG. 1-24.03 (1973).
, 510 S.W.2d at 249.
" KRS § 454.210.
, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Nantz, 516 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1974).
62 KRS § 271.385 (repealed). The new Kentucky Business Corporation Act con-
tains a similar provision. KRS § 271A.555.
KRS § 452.450.
, Rose v. E.W. Bliss Co., 516 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1974).
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